social events, a movement towards further harmonisation (also in copyright law) could even be detrimental to the European cause.
The European Union is currently in a profound crisis. The weakening of the European idea and its values started especially with the rescuing of the banks in the financial crisis of 2009-10 which was mostly implemented through the states taking on large public debts funded by taxpayer's money, and this created sovereign debt was then collectivised in the ESFS and ESM devices. 6 That situation was used to justify economic austerity measures, and Greece in particular was forced to agree to an extended policy of austerity 7 in long bail-out negotiations with EU representatives on 13 July 2015, 8 a course of action which was widely seen as undemocratic and potentially humiliating to a Member State of the EU. 9 Since Germany had a leading role in these negotiations and the method of conduct, perhaps to divert from its then negative image 10 in summer 2015, it invited, initially unrestrictedly, a large number of refugees from the war-torn Middle East. 11 Now Germany and the EU send refugees and migrants back, assisted by an agreement with Turkey. 12 German and EU representatives complain about the lack of solidarity among Member States in the refugee crisis. 13 But the lack of solidarity among Member States cannot come as a surprise with a supranational entity that is completely and almost exclusively grounded on free market competition, 14 the exact opposite of solidarity. The competition in relation to ever lower corporation tax rates and advantageous tax deals 6 See e.g. in more detail as to the technicalities, Ch 7 Well-known economists across the political spectrum always pointed out that austerity measures made it impossible that the Greek economy could recover, though with different arguments and consequences, see e.g. P. Krugman, 'Austerity and the Greek Depression', New York Times, 10 July 2015; H. W. Sinn, 'Greek tragedy', 26 July 2011, http://www.cesifo-group.de/ (visited 8 April 2016). 8 E.g. I. Traynor, 'Greece crisis talks: the July weekend that saved the euro but broke the EU?', I. Traynor, J. Rankin, 'Greek Debt Crisis: Tsipras resists key bailout measures after 15 hours of talks', both in The Guardian, 13 July 2015; M. Uken, 'Alles für den Euro', Die Zeit (online), 13 July 2015. 9 E.g. P. Krugman, 'Killing the European Project', New York Times, Opinion Pages, 12 July 2015; A. Evans-Pritchard, 'Greece is being treated like a hostile occupied state', The Telegraph, 13 July 2015. 10 The treatment of Greece was highly controversial in Germany itself, even among politicians, e.g. J.
Fischer, former German minster of foreign affairs, 'Fatale Entscheidung für ein deutsches Europa', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2015. 11 The ulterior motive for this seemingly generous invitation to Germany was mostly to obtain the cheap labour force of educated young people -what Germany needs because of its demographic situation. 12 The Council of Europe has voiced serious human rights concerns in relation to this 'refugee deal', see J. Rankin, 'Council of Europe condemns EU's refugee deal with Turkey', The Guardian, 20 April 2016. 13 among Member States to the detriment of their national economics illustrates that problem nicely. 15 The referendum on 23 June in the UK which decided in favour of Britain leaving the EU could also be seen a symptom of this crisis, but it was not really. The referendum campaign was largely devoid of intellectual argument and mainly devoted to xenophobia 16 and political infighting within the governing Conservative Party, 17 or to abusive personalised quibbling instead of judicious critique. 18 The existent problems with the EU had hardly ever been discussed genuinely and intelligently, and featured far less in the minds of the voting public than some commentators may now claim when rationalising the result. The decision of the referendum was very unfortunate und unwise. It was, however, foreseeable because of its xenophobe rhetoric, not because of any trenchant criticism of the EU institutions.
It has nevertheless become more difficult to make a convincing argument in favour of the EU at present, and its program of incessant and ever-increasing legal harmonisation plays an important part in that. 16 Notably the only ones in Europe who welcomed the British EU referendum result were far rightwing political parties. 17 It has been amusing to witness that the principal and popular -and populist -campaigner for 'Brexit' and winner of the referendum who used the question of EU membership only for trying to propel himself to the office of prime minister has been brutally eliminated in the last minute by this closest political allies. He used the people for his career but forgot that others would use his for theirs. See e.g. Gordon Rayner, 'How Boris Johnson was brought to his knees by the "cuckoo nest plot"', he positioned himself against the French Enlightenment in particular. 29 Contrary to what an eminent scholar has asserted, 30 Herder was not an opponent of the Enlightenment, as has been shown more recently. 31 Herder's imaginative style of loose associations, sweeping generalisations and elegant imprecision is not only extremely difficult to translate into English (something that can hardly be held against the English 'national character'), it also makes it complicated to ascertain Herder's concepts with sufficient precision. The idea of the 'national character' is no exception. How a people's 'national character' can be
described specifically and what it is shaped by remains hard to establish. Herder says that the character of nations depends not only on climate, the geographical situation and features of nature (such as mountains), 32 but is also influenced by political circumstances. 33 The national character is emphatically not based on race; in fact
Herder sees the term 'race' as entirely inappropriate for humans -every people is a people with a national culture (National-Bildung), race has no relevance here. 34 Reading the Ideen, one can distil a certain notion of 'national character': a culture which is influenced and moulded by climate and topography, genetic predisposition, education, tradition, language, myths, poetry, 35 arts and science -elements which are the result and at the same time the makers of this culture. This culture binds together, or forms, a 'people' or a 'nation', and all peoples or nations are different. From that follows a plurality of cultures and a diversity, a challenge to the then prevalent Enlightenment view of certain principles of the 'science of man' that supposedly applied universally. Different as these peoples and their ways of life are, they are still equal and equivalent, a point Herder keeps stressing. 36 There are no inferior or superior peoples and nations, 37 and historiographers should refrain strictly from favouring a particular people. 38 The diversity of human peoples is also one reason why man is not really made for the State, an artificial and 'inorganic' institution which will hardly lead to man's happiness. 39 The state of nature of man is not war, but peace. 40 'Nobody in the world feels the weakness of general characterising more than I do.
One paints a whole people, age, area -whom has one painted?' 46 But this hermeneutic approach with its fine shades of sympathetic understanding at all levels got lost in a crude reception of Herder's thought in the nineteenth century, particularly where it was supposed to serve political nationalistic objectives. Herder was used as an educational source for the promotion of German nationalism from the 1870s onwards with the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, but largely devoid of Herder's essential and multifaceted idea of (universal) humanism. 47 Herder was also (mis)used by nationalists to justify the rejection of the international organisation of There are certain ideas of uniformity, which sometimes strike great geniuses (for they even affected Charlemagne) but infallibly make an impression on little souls. They find therein a kind of perfection they recognise, because it is impossible for them not to discover it; the same weights by the market authorities, the same measures in commerce, the same laws in the State, the same religions in all parts of the country. But is this always right, and without exception? Is the evil of changing always less than that of suffering? And does not a greatness of genius consist rather in distinguishing between those cases in which uniformity is requisite, and those in which there is a necessity for differences? … If the peoples observe the laws, is it relevant whether they observe the same?
An illustration of the 'Herderian paradox': The problems with EU-wide harmonisation of copyright law
The agenda of the European Union continues to be directed towards further harmonisation of copyright law. The European Parliament passed a resolution on 9 63 At the same time the resolution 'calls for a reaffirmation of the principle of territoriality' (in the context of fair remuneration) and notes 'that the right to private property is one of the fundaments of modern society' 64 which creates, apart from interesting political implications, some tension with a Europe-wide harmonisation of copyright law. After all, intellectual property rights as a form of property rights have territoriality as an essential feature, and territoriality is a critical hurdle in the harmonisation project. 65 The recently proposed EU-Directive on Copyright in the Digital Market also seeks to tackle the problem of territoriality in a digital environment in relation to exceptions and limitations within digital and crossborder uses in the area of education, text and data mining for scientific research, and preservation of cultural heritage. Again, the property nature of copyright has been stressed. 66 The proprietary quality of intellectual property rights becomes difficult with enforcement and the fragmentation of the (online) licencing market. 67 In an instance or social reifier of the expressed idea. 83 Music is a good example: the idea in the copyright sense, melody, harmony, rhythm, condenses to an idea in the philosophical sense, a specific melody/harmony/rhythm in a composer's head. It manifests itself in a physical expression in the outside world, through sound, and/or a score in which the music is written down as a performance instruction: this expression is the work in the copyright sense. This is the same in the copyright and the author's rights systems: the difference is only that the copyright system of the UK requires recording/fixation of this physical expression, 84 for example in form of a musical score, while in the author's rights countries the fixation is facultative, 85 but in reality inevitable for obtaining evidence in a copyright infringement trial. In both cases we have a creation which would qualify as a musical work, whereby the work is not the score (or, in case of a poem, not the printed paper in a book), but the score is one instance of the manifested materialisation of the work. This is the starting point for establishing whether that work is also original. 
The content of the concept of 'originality'
The understanding of the concept of originality in copyright is at the centre of the development of a harmonising impact of CJEU case law on copyright. Otherwise unified areas only comprise rather special issues, such as the question of copyright levies for the use of private copying exceptions as fair compensation. 95 The CJEU has declared the concept of 'fair compensation' (deriving from the Rental and Lending States -which could fill the empty vessel of the definition of originality ('the author's own intellectual creation') with meaningful content. The CJEU case law that brought about this development has been dealt with extensively, so that a detailed discussion need not be repeated here. 2). 107 The Information Society Directive refers to 'works' 108 which are only protected if they are original. At EU level, three Directives define originality as the author's own intellectual creation 109 in relation to computer programmes, databases and photographs. 110 The ECJ then concludes that there is copyright protection for a 'work' 111 only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author's own intellectual creation. The Football Dataco decision is relevant particularly for the originality criterion of the copyright system of the UK because it declared that 'the significant labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot as such justify such a protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of the data which that database contains.' 123 This means that the classical 'skill and labour' criterion for originality in UK copyright law no longer suffices (for all types of work?) and has to be supplemented with the vague 'own intellectual creation' criterion, which is directed at some change to UK law, though nobody knows exactly in which way. The Advocate-General's opinion was here more explicit, but more openly against the tradition of the UK: 'copyright protection is conditional upon the database being characterised by a 'creative' aspect, and it is not sufficient that the creation of the database required labour and skill', and 'intellectual creation' … 'echoes a formula which is typical of the continental copyright 124 In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the subject's pose and the lighting. When taking a portrait photograph, he can choose the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created. Finally, when selecting the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of developing techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software.
In short, the criterion is that of artistically irrelevant choice. 132 The exercise of human choice can be interpreted as conferring a 'personal touch' on the work. But that is also realised in form of especially 'judgement' in the classical British understanding of originality as 'skill and labour'. 133 One could rephrase the findings of the CJEU for the UK as the author being required to apply his judgement to make selections and choices in the creation of the work to obtain originality. Through these choices he expresses creative ability, irrespective of whether this 'creativity' has any artistic merit. 134 That only moves the UK towards the US approach in Feist, 135 but it does not turn the UK into an author's rights country, as some academics have indicated. 136 The author's rights countries protect the work through the protection of its author's personality, while the copyright systems protect the author through the protection of his work as property. 137 The practical difference is, however, very limited. Thus one can interpret the concept of originality in UK copyright law in outward conformity with the CJEU decisions on originality (which might -simplistically -be regarded as having more an author's rights flavour), and so achieve at least ostensibly harmonisation. It is unclear whether that approach was intended by the CJEU -if one can establish at all what was intended. Other countries may do the same as the UK: if that is regarded a harmonisation, then the CJEU was successful, if that is not the idea of harmonisation, then the respective attempts of the CJEU have failed.
However, it is obvious that, in line with the agenda of the EU towards harmonisation and unification of laws to enable and support the common market, the CJEU seeks to achieve a harmonisation of the understanding of originality across all areas of copyright and across all jurisdictions of the Member States. The fact that the exact extent and meaning of this harmonised EU originality is rather vague at present, does not quell the pressure towards an overriding concept which may be perceived as a forceful intrusion in Member States' laws without their parliamentary consent. A complex concept such as originality in copyright that has grown in a particular cultural and legal tradition with an individual body of case law is probably unsuitable for proper harmonisation across the EU. 138 It is telling that the Wittem European Copyright Code does not attempt a definition of 'originality' and just uses 'author's own intellectual creation.' The footnotes make clear that the Code does not decide generally in favour of either the 'personal stamp/touch' or the 'skill and labour' originality. 139 The Herderian paradox can become apparent in such a situation: even if a desired harmonisation is ineffective it can nevertheless drive EU Member States apart.
The role of moral rights, and copyright transferability
The concept of originality and the philosophical differences between copyright and author's rights systems are closely connected with the position of moral rights within the corresponding protection system. As said, the copyright systems are concerned with the creation of the property of copyright by its author through his/her own skill, labour, effort and judgment and protect the author for the investment in the making of the copyright property. Thus copyright is essentially a protection against parasitical unfair competition in the continental European understanding, but does not require an individualisation of a distinct authorial personality for the definition of originality.
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A personality protection in form of moral rights is therefore not part of the copyright protection system, and indeed, the moral rights rules have been tacked on like the scaffolding to a building, mostly in light of Art. 6bis of the Berne Convention -in the UK in 1988, in the US (as a partial protection system) in 1990, in Australia in 2000. 141 One could see the copyright-moral right relationship as an extremely dualist system. 142 In contrast, the moral rights regime in the author's rights countries is the skeleton and metal frame of the author's rights house without which it would collapse. Hence the concept of originality in author's rights countries requires some personal features in the work which refer back to an individual author: the work must between copyright and design law, L. Bently, 'Case Comment: The return of industrial copyright?' (2012) 34(10) EIPR 654-672, at 663-664 (on Flos (C-168/09). 139 Wittem Project, European Copyright Code, Art. 1.1 (1) and footnotes 6 and 7: '(6) The Code does not use or define the term original, but in practice it might still be used to indicate that the production qualifies as a (protected) work. (7) The term 'the author's own intellectual creation' is derived from the acquis (notably for computer programs, databases and photographs). It can be interpreted as the 'average' European threshold, presuming it is set somewhat higher than skill and labour. This is possible if emphasis is put on the element of creation. For factual and functional works, the focus will be more on a certain level of skill (judgement) and labour, whereas for productions in the artistic field the focus will be more on personal expression. 'bear the stamp of the author', be 'the imprint of the author's personality', 143 or, as the German statute states, must be a 'personal intellectual creation'. 144 The Austrian equivalent provision is even more instructive when it says 'specific/peculiar intellectual creations'. 145 This is to be distinguished from the originality rule in the EU Directives, 'own intellectual creation', which stresses that the work must originate from the author, but not necessarily that it must be specific and too personal. Thus EU law, as it stands, does not invite a more comprehensive moral rights regime, nor would the lobbying groups of the copyright industries be interested in that: the absence of the moral rights rules of Art. 6bis in the otherwise wholesale import of the But transferability would presumably be of major interest to the copyright industries and their lobbying groups. A possible compromise could be the change of the monist approach in Germany and Austria to the dualist approach, as in France, 152 so that assignability would be formally possible, 153 but the moral rights regime would not be weakened at all. The monist approach in Germany and Austria is the result of legal doctrine; it is not an entirely inevitable interpretation of the statute. 154 Although such a modification would be in legal interpretation and doctrine only, it is unlikely to happen in Germany -or in Austria, where the monist theory originated. 155 A more radical departure by way of statutory amendment is even less realistic. Any attempt at the approximation of the author's rights systems' concept of moral rights towards that of the copyright regime of the UK and the US, with free assignability of copyright and an almost irrelevant status of the moral rights, would probably lead to an all-out war with the author's rights countries, although the practical importance of the moral rights is surprisingly limited there.
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The matter is ideological -one can make politics with copyright. In the last years copyright has become one of the best known areas of the law among the general public. The principles of moral rights are easy to understand and are suitable to be packed into political and populist slogans which political parties, especially EUsceptical parties, may use. In the present unstable political climate it is possible that a populist mass movement can add a further argument against the already weakened EU by pretending to fight for the indefeasibility of the national and traditional paternity and integrity rights against the 'undemocratic dictate from Brussels'. 157 It is true,
almost nobody knows what the dualist and monist approaches are, but that is irrelevant: 158 an academically informed populism is a contradiction in terms. Who understood the theological implications of the word 'filioque' added to the credo which contributed to the division between the Western and the Eastern Churches? 159 Conceptually a compromise on moral rights is very hard to imagine, politically it can probably not be achieved. That said, without a compromise a functioning harmonisation of core copyright law in the EU is unrealistic in the long run.
Therefore, it will probably be wise to drop altogether any ambitions to harmonise or unify the copyright laws in Europe for the foreseeable future, and the probable departure of the main copyright jurisdiction of the UK from the EU may not necessarily make matters much easier. Some diversity may help retaining unity.
Exceptions and limitations
The copyright exceptions and limitations also allow an analysis of the 'Herderian paradox'. The harmonisation of this area is Art. 5 of the Information Society Directive, 160 containing mandatory (Art. 5 (1)) and facultative (Art. 5 (2) and (3) limitations: it could not be otherwise, for the idea of 'unity in diversity' runs counter to the general EU agenda of harmonising the national laws for further economic integration. As one would expect, the new Proposal restates the general principle of harmonisation for enhancing the functioning of the internal market. 173 Although Art.
5 of the Information Society Directive does not actually harmonise the exceptions and limitations in effect very much because of its facultative provisions, it is nevertheless officially regarded as doing exactly that. 174 The exceptions and limitations cannot be seen as a demonstration of any 'Herderian' notion of diversity in EU law-making. The considered autonomous concepts of EU copyright law can be seen as applications of the doctrine of EU pre-emption. In case of conflicts between national law of a Member State and supranational EU law the doctrine of pre-emption determines if and to what extent the national law will be set aside by EU law. 175 Following US constitutional law doctrine, one can distinguish between field preemption (EU has exhaustively legislated for the field, i.e. to the complete exclusion of national law), obstacle pre-emption (material conflict between European and national law, but not in relation to a specific European rule) and rule pre-emption (national legislation contradicts a specific European rule). These pre-emptions can be express or implied. 176 The EU pre-emption doctrine is also relevant to EU copyright law. 177 The basis for a comprehensive unifying copyright Regulation would be Article 118
TFEU. 178 This statutory basis and the ensuing application of pre-emption leaves the extent of the actual harmonisation to judicial interpretation by the national courts first and, finally and decisively, to the CJEU. 179 The actual statutory text of a Directivehere the most relevant one is the Information Society Directive -normally appears as not too dirigiste and obligatory in its harmonising thrust in that it allows for significant discretion, or, put differently, legal uncertainty. of the EU legal system between most, not all, EU Member States as sovereign states. 181 It is not impossible that this route of implementation could be taken for particularly contentious issues in copyright. A similar method has partly been applied already for the introduction of the EU unitary patent system: the 'unified patent court' was introduced by separate international agreement, 182 and the relevant Regulations undermines the EU itself as a supranational legislating entity and, because of its doubtful democratic legitimacy and transparency, may be constitutionally most problematic in many of the respective Member States. It is a form of integration that makes the EU appear redundant and is ultimately corrosive to the very fabric and the idea of the EU.
Conclusion
The European Union is under high pressure as never before in history: the banking crisis and ensuing sovereign debt crisis, especially in southern European Member
States, and the refugee crisis, contribute substantially to the predicament of the EU.
Further legal integration and harmonisation of laws at EU level do not strengthen the EU, but only have an additional corrosive effect: the more one concentrates on legal unification at EU level, the more will the national Member States drift apart, politically and legally. This 'Herderian paradox', as one may call this causal connection, is a phenomenon EU officials and legal academics should take to heart soon if they do not want to become an involuntary instrument in the disintegration of the EU as an idea and as a political and economic reality. Copyright may appear as a small area of law among the vast body of EU legislation and regulation. But copyright can obtain a 'face': it is an area of the law relatively well-known to the general public who encounter copyright (and infringement) with their computers, internet, the 'consumption' of music and films, and photographs: things everybody uses or creates.
Agitation of EU-hostile populist political parties is unlikely to work with abstract and technical banking regulation, but can be quite successful in relation to copyright, among other themes. For example, EU opponents do not discuss the possible constitutional shift towards intergovernmental institutions within the EU outside the supranational constitutional system of the EU in the wake of the euro crisis, 186 but immigration. In the future, it could also be moral rights or fair dealing.
Further harmonisation of copyright law is not only questionable on pragmatic political grounds, it is also unproductive on legal grounds. Fundamental concepts of copyright law, such as originality and moral rights, can either not be defined with sufficient precision at EU level to achieve a true harmonisation among Member States (originality), or the ideological conceptual differences are too great that the Member
States cannot achieve a compromise without an unacceptable damage to the legal tradition of one or even both sides (moral rights). Purported harmonisation through ineffective tools (Directives which allow generously Member States to opt out 187 ) or veiled harmonisation through judicial ingenuity, but not necessarily consistency, by the CJEU, do not promote the European cause and give succour to the argument that the EU has a serious democratic deficit. 188 The question remains what will happen to the present copyright regime in the UK which prepares leaving the EU after the 'Brexit' referendum. The question were similar if the EU were really to disintegrate, a perspective which has become a possibility for the first time in history. The EU could be destabilised further with the UK having decided to leave the EU. An end of the EU (and that would presumably occur in several phases) probably has little fundamental effect on the copyright systems in the Member States for the time being. For Britain, apart from the international conventions (Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Treaties in particular 189 ), expediency will decide in favour of the continued existence of the copyright Directives, since they are implemented in the national laws. Law is characterised by inertia, and it is unwise to abolish useful EU legislation just because it comes from the EU. Gradually the respective national laws will deviate from one another by legal amendments and emergence of national case law, but the discrepancy is unlikely to become too great in a world of global trade and the internet. It is rather possible that former EU Member States would conclude intergovernmental treaties on issues of copyright law which harmonise the law on the basis of classical public international law. The EU itself has gone down this route in other areas, especially in the regulations concerning the sovereign debt crisis, 190 and so has played inadvertently into the hands of critics who may argue that the EU demonstrates its own irrelevance as a supranational organisation. However, one should not blame the EU too much. It is the sole responsibility of the UK if a severe contraction of the markets occurs and if its territory may disintegrate as a result of the rather irrational decision in favour of a 'Brexit' (constitutionally the implementation of 'Brexit' may prove difficult). Furthermore, the UK has deprived itself of the opportunity to take part in necessary essential reforms of the EU for more pluralism. But even without the UK, it would be desirable to have a more flexible European Union which expands and contracts among its Member States during different historical epochs like a flexible universe based on the EU Treaties, rather than having a relentless gravitational force towards ever more legal and economic integration and unification: such a development would lead to a black hole. That also applies to the harmonisation of copyright in the EU. The European idea (especially, never ever war again between European countries) is less attached to the institutions of the EU or the UK than these may think. The European idea is older and stronger, more intellectual and more human. Copyright is the area of law that can show that.
______________________
